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Abstract: The Indonesian Islamists’ rejection of demo-
cracy, as this paper will demonstrate, is not monolithic; it is 
complex and multifaceted that is accompanied by a long 
process of argument building. This paper focuses its scope 
of analysis on Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), a Middle 
Eastern-derived “transnational” Islamist movement that 
seeks to unite all Muslim nations all over the world under a 
Caliphate system. This paper argues that, in developing 
counter-discourses on democracy, the HTI activists employ 
both theological approach and modern socio-political 
narratives. It is also argued that the concept of enemy 
constructed by the HTI activists serves only as an 
ontological venture, and not existential one, for the 
purpose of self-fulfilling prophecy. The process of 
construction of the enemy follows the mode of binary 
opposition between the “authentic self” and the “corrupted 
other.” This paper borrows much of its theoretical 
framework from Saphiro, Foucault, Berger and Luckmann, 
and still many others.  
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Introduction 
The fact that the majority of Indonesian Islamists reject the idea of 
democracy is nothing new. The bulk of research projects conducted 
                                                 
1 This paper is a part of my dissertation entitled “Islam, Islamism and Democracy: 
Islamist Discourses and Counter-Discourses on Democracy in Post-New Order 
Indonesia,” submitted to the University of Melbourne, March 2007, and also my 
forthcoming book published by ISEAS Singapore. 
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within the period of post-New Order Indonesia have underlined this. 
Most scholarly works have only arrived at the bold statement that 
Indonesian Islamists reject the notion of democracy. No further 
explanation has been made in terms of how and to what extent 
democracy is being  rejected. As a consequence, the Islamists’ rejection 
of democracy serves as a monolithic reference among researchers at 
home and abroad. Misconceptions and misunderstandings about the 
detailed picture of the Islamists’ rejection of democracy are simply 
unavoidable along with the result of research projects on Islamism and 
democracy in Indonesia. 
Those misconceptions and misunderstandings about the whole 
picture of Indonesian Islamism can lead to fatal theoretical 
oversimplification and reductionism about the subject that can further 
risk the image of entire Muslim community at large. One of the 
obvious cases in point is the sociological categorization often made by 
some “uninformed” researchers who often lump the word “Islamist” 
together with “fundamentalist” or even “terrorist” under a single 
bracket. This has to be made clear due in part to the fact that Islamism 
is not a discrete category disassociated from the socio-cultural web of 
Indonesian Islam in general. It is quite often that Islamism is a melting 
and at times sporadic category, the boundaries of which can both 
shrink and swell, contingent upon the circumstances surrounding the 
Muslim community in general. There is a vast ideological array in 
which radical phenomena are being integrated and shared by many 
different segments of Muslims in Indonesia. This is exactly the 
theoretical gap left by previous research projects that must be resolved 
in order to avoid such a fatal oversimplification and reductionism.  
This paper is intended to fill the gap by focusing its analysis on 
socio-political construction of anti-democracy discourses among the 
HTI activists. The main question developed throughout the paper is 
how democracy is constructed as the enemy among the Islamists and 
on what basis it is rejected. The paper will be divided into three main 
parts as follows; the first part deals with theoretical framework used as 
its tool of analysis, the second presents a brief portrait of HTI, and the 
last part represents the main section of the paper, namely the socio-
political construction of anti-democracy discourses among HTI 
activists. 
 
  343 JOURNAL OF INDONESIAN ISLAM 
Volume 03, Number 02, December 2009 
Socio-political Construction of anti-Democracy Discourse 
Theoretical Framework 
As one of methodological breakthroughs in social sciences and 
humanities, the existence of constructivism deserves due appreciation. 
In the study of religions, Peter L. Berger is a pioneer for the birth of 
constructivism.2 The underlying assumption upon which this approach 
is erected is that all happens within any society is a result of 
construction process, and religion occupies a special locus within such 
a process. What is perceived as a reality by the society, thus, basically 
refers to the construction. No reality stands alone outside of the 
process of social construction. The entity of religion, therefore, is a 
part of social construction of its believers. 
In Berger’s theoretical framework, as a part of sociological process, 
the reality of religion undergoes a dialectical process through three 
main  steps; externalization, objectivication, and internalization. Berger 
defines externalization as “the ongoing outpouring of human being 
into the world, both the physical and the mental activity of men.”3 
Externalization, in Berger’s view, can be categorized as an 
anthropological need. A human being, as empirically observed, cannot 
be understood partially from the context of his/her involvement 
within the society where he/she lives. Humans cannot be perceived as 
him/herself, as being deprived from the societal structure. Since their 
early existence, humans are born and developed within socially defined 
roles and structures.  
Berger defines objectivication as “the attainment by the products 
of this activity (again both physical and mental) of a reality that 
confronts its original producers as a facticity external to and other than 
themselves.”4 At this stage, as soon as humans are created, the world 
has become inseparable from them, something out there, occupying 
the distant spaces different from the creator, human. Within this 
distance lies the core concept of objectivication. Anything that the 
human has created has become an independent and separate object 
that is not easily touched, malleable and conquered by its creator. Even 
though all cultures are derived from the deep consciousness of human 
being, as soon as they are created they cannot be easily permeated and 
absorbed arbitrarily. Cultures are independent within their own space, 
                                                 
2 Peter L. Berger, The Sacred Canopy (New York & London: Anchor Books, 1990). 
3 Ibid., p. 4. 
4 Ibid., p. 4. 
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becoming objective reality that is independent from their creator, i.e. 
human. 
Internalization, Berger argues, refers to “the absorption into 
consciousness of the objectivated world in such a way that the 
structures of this world come to determine the subjective structures of 
consciousness itself.”5 Internalization is a process of perceiving 
empirical reality created by human and permeating it into the deep 
structure of individual’s cognition. As a process of construction, 
internalization constitutes subjective biases as a result of distortions of 
meaning in it. Soon after it serves as an objective reality, in the next 
step society plays as a formative agent for individual’s consciousness. 
Along with the process of internalization, the objective reality he/she 
sees and perceives will become subjective reality deeply internalized 
within his/her consciousness. 
Berger further argues that like cultures and languages, religion is 
the product of human’s construction by which a sacred cosmology is 
formed. In other words, religion serves as cosmization in a sacred 
mode.6 By “sacred” here means a mysterious power beyond human’s 
power but still associated with what is believed to occupy within a 
particular existence. This quality may be attributed to artificial matters, 
animals, humans, or objectivied human’s cultures. There are sacred 
rocks, sacred tools, and sacred cows alike. There are also sacred 
leaders, as well as particular traditions or institutions. Space and time 
may be attributed with the same quality of sacredness, like sacred 
places or sacred seasons.  
Historical manifestation about the sacredness takes different forms 
between one particular society and the other, although there is an 
agreement in several cultures (no matter whether the idea of 
sacredness is a result of cultural diffusion or deepest logics of religious 
imagination). The idea of sacredness is perceived as something sticking 
out from normal daily activities. Even though the idea of sacredness 
can be understood as something beyond people, in reality it refers to 
humans, associated with them. Sacred cosmology embodies within 
religion, therefore, overpower and embody humans. The sacred 
cosmology is faced by humans as a great reality outside of themselves. 
                                                 
5 Ibid., p. 15. 
6 Ibid., p. 25. 
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Nevertheless, this reality refers to humans and puts them in a 
meaningful order of life.  
In a similar vein, Olivier Roy argues that religion is a matter of 
construction rather than reality. He further asserts that “The many 
different Islam's (liberal, fundamentalist, conservative) with which we 
are familiar are more a construction than a reality.”7 This assumption is 
particularly justified by “erratic pattern” of life path of an individual, 
which represents more than a long lively journey of “becoming” than a 
stagnant enterprise. One may, at any point in time, live in a very liberal 
manner, then experience a spiritual crisis, and may later join an Islamic 
radical group before turning more “bourgeois” and perhaps becoming 
a community leader in his surroundings. For that reason, Roy insists 
that the culturalist approach fails to reveal the very reality of religion 
because it is mostly trapped in the shift of emphasis from discussing 
religion to religiosity.8 The issue of religion, within its time and space 
limits, is time and again exploited as a means for justifying one’s quest 
for something in line with his interests. 
It has commonly been argued that the processes of reconstruction 
and deconstruction are an integral part of the making of religion within 
which religious public debates over particular religious indictments are 
simply unavoidable.9 As a result, religious opinions are subject to the 
                                                 
7 This framework of thinking has long become an independent school of thought in 
the fields of Sociology and Philosophy called “constructivism.” This theoretical 
construct is primarily based on the Kantian paradigm on the reality of human 
knowledge. In Kant’s view, our knowledge is not in itself the authentic reflection of 
reality, because it is constructed on the basis of human categories. Human knowledge 
and experiences are therefore human constructions rather than a reflection of genuine 
reality. For further discussion on this issue, see, for instance, George Karuvelil, 
“Constructing ‘God’: A Contemporary Interpretation of Religion,” HeyJ XLI (2000), 
pp. 25-46; cf. Michael Arbib and Mary Hesse, The Construction of Reality (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1986). 
8 Olivier Roy, Globalised Islam: The Search for a New Ummah (London: Hurst, 2004), p. 9.  
9 Deconstruction is a method widely used in Philosophy to challenge, contest, or 
simply “interrogate” existing philosophical theories and concepts. This method has 
recently also been used in the context of religious studies, especially in Islamic studies 
by Muslim intellectuals such as Mohammed Arkoun. Derrida is one of the most 
acknowledged “prophets” of this method. He defines deconstruction as a method of 
“interrogating a concept, a word, a text, or a position. Just as a deconstruction of a 
philosophical problem neither solves it nor dissolves it, similarly, a deconstruction of a 
text or position is not a refutation of the text or position.” For more detailed 
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process of construction and deconstruction, mainly due to the fact that 
their meanings are publicly contested. In the course of the history of 
religious thought in Islam, nuances of change and continuity are 
omnipresent.10 This means that while some parts of religion are subject 
to change, some other parts of it are believed to remain unchanged. 
The process of confirmation, challenge, and validation of religious 
indictments will continue to occur as long as an institutional 
mechanism to do so exists in religion. In Islam, for instance, there 
exists such an institutional mechanism whose role is to validate or 
reinvigorate the old with the new, namely ijtiha>d, through which a 
process of construction and deconstruction of religious indictments is 
the corollary.11  
Warriors need enemies, without which the self will mean nothing. 
The entity of the enemy is not something constructed in a vacuum, 
socially and politically. This means that “if an enemy is not 
ontologically present in the nature of things, one must be 
manufactured.”12 To Islamists, the word enemy can take different 
forms from time to time, contingent upon the context of when and 
where Islam is present. Berger and Luckmann itemize the steps 
through which a process of social construction proceeds: naming, 
legitimation, mythmaking, sedimentation, and ritual.13 The conception 
of an enemy begins with naming or “labeling,” a crucial step in the 
                                                                                                      
information on this issue see, for instance, Ralph Shain, “Situating Derrida: Between 
Kierkegaard and Hegel,” Philosophy Today 44, No. 4 (Winter 2004), pp. 388-403. 
10 For a more detailed theoretical account on change and continuity in Islam see, for 
example, John Obert Voll, Islam, Continuity and Change in the Modern World (Boulder, 
Colorado: Westview Press, 1982). 
11 Ijtiha >d, derived from the Arabic root j-h-d, meaning serious struggle, is a term 
commonly used in the context of Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh) to mean an intellectual 
struggle done by selected religious scholars to solve Muslims’ contemporary problems 
which are not explicitly decreed in both pristine texts of Islam: the Qur’an and Hadith. 
For more detailed information on this see for example, B. Weiss, “Interpretation in 
Islamic Law: the Theory of Ijtiha >d,” in I. Edge (ed.), The International Library of Essays in 
Law & Legal Theory: Legal Cultures, 7 (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1996), pp. 273-286. Cf. 
Wael B. Hallaq, “Was the gate of Ijtiha >d closed?,” in I. Edge (ed.), The International 
Library of Essays in Law & Legal Theory, pp. 287-325. 
12 James A. Aho, This Thing of Darkness: A Sociology of the Enemy (Seattle and London: 
University of Washington Press, 1994), p. 26. 
13 Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality (Garden City, 
N.Y.: Doubleday-Anchor, 1967). 
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process of social construction. It is common in public discourses that 
defamatory labels are imposed onto persons, entities, acts, or situations 
that might not represent the reality precisely. This step is followed by 
legitimation, whereby the labels are validated. One of the vehicles for 
implementing this is the public degradation ceremony. The next step is 
mythmaking, in which a word and myth are built to support the 
construction of an enemy. To do this, authoritative jargon must be 
used, documenting how the victim’s case fits the official “scientific” 
theory of evil.14 The next step is sedimentation, a step where a process 
of transmission of knowledge takes place from person to person, agent 
to agent. The culminating step in the social construction of an enemy 
is the ritual, where a process of self-fulfilling prophecy occurs. Despite 
their costs, they do provide a perverse sense of sacrifice. Routine 
combat against perceived internal and external enemies endlessly 
generates the very evildoers.  
The Portrait of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI)  
Hizbut Tahrir etymologically means “Liberation Party”. Originally, 
this movement was a transnational political party, established in 1952 
in Jerusalem by Taqi> al-Di>n al-Nabha>ni >.15 He himself was born in 
Palestine who had studied at the Al-Azhar University and the Da>r al-
‘Ulu >m in Cairo, Egypt. This learned man was a judge and a lecturer in 
Palestine, Jordan and Jerusalem. In 1948 he migrated to Beirut, 
Lebanon. From that time onwards he did not have a permanent place 
to live, because he migrated more often from one place to another 
between Jordan, Syria and Lebanon. After he passed away, his position 
had been replaced by ‘Abd al-Qadi>m Zallu >m from Palestine. 
As mentioned in its website, Hizbut Tahrir’s objective is “to 
resume the Islamic way of life by establishing an Islamic State that 
executes the systems of Islam and carries its call to the world.”16 In 
relation to its construct of state, Hizbut Tahrir (HT) favors the theme 
of establishment of a transnational Islamic caliphate (al-Khila>fah al-
Isla>miyyah).17 In order to achieve its goals and ideals, HT claims to 
                                                 
14 James A. Aho, This Thing of Darkness, p. 30. 
15 See, http://www.hizbuttahrir.org.uk.  
16 Ibid. 
17 For more detailed information on the doctrine of Khilafah Islamiyah see, among 
others, Suha Taji-Farouki, A Fundamental Quest: Hizb al-Tahrir and the Search for the 
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follow three steps of struggle (marh}alah): (1) Marh}alah Tathqi >f (character 
building and cadre recruitment) which puts its emphasis on the 
establishment of the party’s cadres, the framework for building the 
movement, and developing its followers with its organized and 
intensive character building materials; (2) Marh}alah Tafa>‘ul ma‘a al-
Ummah (interaction with communities) through which the organization 
hopes to make all elements of society aware that Islam is the only 
solution for their daily problems, and; (3) Marh}alah Istila>m al-H{ukm 
(seizing power) through peaceful means. This is the culmination of the 
process where the final goals of HT, namely the implementation of the 
Islamic Shari >‘a or the Islamic state can be accomplished under its al-
Khila>fah al-Isla>miyah.18  
Based on the three abovementioned steps, HTI sets up the 
following three missions: (1) To resume the life of Islam. The mission 
of HTI is to ensure the continuity of Islam and its implementation at a 
practical level; (2) To establish Khila>fah Isla>mi >yah by extending networks 
among all elements of the Muslim world, and; (3) To provide 
education to the wider society in order to make them think and behave 
in an Islamic manner.19  
In Indonesia, HTI was established in 1982 and was introduced by 
Abdurrahman al-Baghdadi, the leader of Hizbut Tahrir in Australia 
who moved to Bogor, West Java, at the invitation of KH Abdullah bin 
Nuh, the principal of pesantren Al-Ghazali and a lecturer at the 
Literature Faculty of the University of Indonesia (UI).20 During his stay 
in this city, he interacted with many Muslim activists from the mosque 
Al-Ghifari, which was the headquarter of Muslim activists in the 
Institute of Agriculture Bogor (IPB).21 Like the Tarbiyah movement, 
                                                                                                      
Islamic Caliphate (London: Grey Seal, 1996). See also, Hizbut Tahrir, The Methodology of 
Hizbut-Tahrir for Change (London: Al-Khilafah Publications, n.d.). 
18 “Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia: Dakwah Masjid yang Menggurita,” Sabili, No. 9/XI, 
special edition, 2003, p. 143. Cf. Taqiyuddin Al-Nabhani, Pembentukan Partai Politik 
Islam (Bogor: Thariqul Izzah, 2002), p. 34.  
19 Endang Turmudi & Riza Sihbudi (Eds.), Islam dan Radikalisme di Indonesia (Jakarta: 
LIPI Press, 2005), p. 277. 
20 See Agus Salim, “The Rise of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (1982-2004): Its Political 
Opportunity Structure, Resource Mobilization, and Collective Action Frames” (Jakarta: 
UIN Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta, Masters Thesis, 2005), p. 5.  
21 “Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia: Dakwah Masjid yang Menggurita,” pp. 142-3. 
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HTI spread out rapidly around student circles through the network of 
“dakwah kampus”, which reached its peak under the New Order when 
the Soeharto regime imposed a ban on all student political activities 
through the Campus Normalization Act in 1978. Since that time, like 
many other Islamic activist groups, HTI became a clandestine 
movement until the fall of New Order regime. 
The ideas and ideology of HTI were disseminated through learning 
circles known as h}alaqah. Through these h}alaqahs the participants read 
HTI’s publications which constitute such issues as Shahshi>yah Isla>mi >yah 
(Islamic Personality), Fikr al-Isla>m (Islamic Thought), and Niz}a>m al-
Isla>m (Islamic System). Starting from this point, HTI started to 
propagate its ideology outside Bogor through campus networks known 
as Lembaga Dakwah Kampus (LDK/Campus Dakwah Institute) in 
several university campuses such as UNPAD Bandung, UI Jakarta, 
UGM Yogyakarta, IKIP Malang, UNAIR Surabaya, IKIP Surabaya, 
UNHAS Makassar – all of which are notably secular campuses – and 
eventually reached every province of the country.22  
In 1987, KH Abdullah bin Nuh passed away and his position was 
taken over by local activists such as Muhammad Al-Khaththath and 
Muhammad Isma’il Yusanto as the spokesmen of the movement. HTI 
has gradually increased its membership and claimed to have more than 
10.000 followers. In relation to this, Sadanand Dhume, a former 
Indonesia correspondent of the Far Eastern Economic Review and The 
Asian Wall Street Journal in Jakarta, observes that Hizbut Tahrir 
Indonesia has grown more rapidly than other Islamic radical groups, 
particularly in South Sulawesi, where Neo-Salafi movements are also 
active.23 
Unlike other Islamist groups and organizations which are usually 
sporadic and less well-organized, HTI is one of the better-organized 
Islamist organizations in Indonesia, comprising mainly middle-class 
Muslims from relatively well-educated backgrounds. HTI and its 
activists, thus, is a typically modern organization. HTI serves as a 
reservoir for middle-class Muslims with a strong longing for spiritual 
                                                 
22 Elizabeth Fuller Collins, “Islam is the Solution: Dakwah and Democracy in 
Indonesia,” unpublished paper, p. 9. 
23 Sadanand Dhume, “Hizbut Tahrir Using War in Iraq to Seek Converts,” Far Eastern 
Economic Review (April 3, 2003), as cited by Elizabeth Fuller Collins, “Islam is the 
Solution: Dakwah and Democracy in Indonesia,” p. 14. 
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assistance. Within this organization lies a unique mixture between the 
elements of modernity and the elements of salafism, even though at 
times it is unclear whether it represents a version of indigenous or 
Arabicized Islam.24 This eclectic attitude in turn influences the stance it 
takes amidst the diverse Islamic movements in the country. As a result, 
it is not surprising that HTI tends to choose a moderate stance with an 
intellectual mode as its means of dakwah. Most of its members are 
attracted to the ideas of HTI not because of coercive indoctrination, 
but because of the intelligibility of the narratives on Islam provided by 
its ideologues. HTI mostly deploys international issues inflicting upon 
Islam and the Muslim world as the basis of its campaign towards the 
establishment of Khila>fah Isla>mi >yah, even though its activists are also 
very much concerned with domestic social and political issues.  
As mentioned earlier, HTI considers itself to be a political party, 
even though it is not registered as a party with the Departemen 
Kehakiman dan HAM (Ministry of Justice and Human Rights) to 
compete in general elections. HTI defines a political party in a broader 
sense as an organization that seeks to restore the existing political 
system and build it in the way it believes to be true. As a political party, 
HTI has three main characteristics: (1) This party bases itself on Islam 
as its ideology and rejects any man-made ideologies such as democracy 
and Pancasila; (2) It is a transnational organization in its scope due to 
the fact that HTI is a part of an international organization whose 
branches are spread all over the world, and; (3) Its activities are extra-
parliamentarian. That is why HTI does not want to be part of existing 
political parties which compete openly with one another in general 
elections. Nevertheless, HTI does not have social and educational 
bodies such as NU and Muhammadiyah.25HTI, according to Ismail 
Yusanto, offers a comprehensive solution to the problems faced by 
human beings. In doing so, HTI starts with establishing a Muslim 
community by developing two main programs reflecting the elements 
of the community. The first program is called shakhshi>yah Isla>mi >yah 
                                                 
24 What struck me a lot is the fact that Ismail Yusanto, the spokesman of HTI, is 
fashionably modern and intellectually articulate. When I asked him for an interview, he 
proposed a high class hotel restaurant in Kuningan, a bustling business district in 
South Jakarta. This amazed me a lot because in this restaurant all kinds of people can 
be found, from domestic high-class businessmen to expatriate foreigners whose food 
taste is very much different to that of a Muslim activist such as Yusanto.  
25 Endang Turmudi and Riza Sihbudi (eds), Islam dan Radikalisme di Indonesia, p. 273. 
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(Islamic personality), buttressed by two pillars of society 
empowerment; namely politics and economy. These pillars give 
impetus to the rise of Islamic economics (including Islamic non-
interest banking system), Islamic politics, Dawlah Isla>mi >yah, and 
eventually culminates in the Khila>fah Isla>mi >yah. In general, HTI is 
concerned with the attempt to develop an Islamic civilization (thaqa>fah 
Isla>mi >yah) comprising Islamic thought and Islamic law. In HTI’s terms, 
there are three interrelated fundamental A’s as a point of departure: 
ara>’ (viewpoint), afka>r (thought), and ah}ka>m (laws).26  
As far as HTI’s viewpoints are concerned, it is clear that this 
organization shares the same ideas with other Islamist organizations, 
such as al-Ikhwa>n al-Muslimu >n (IM) in Egypt, even though Yusanto 
rejects this assumption.27 In his opinion, IM differs from HTI in the 
approaches and strategies it adopts. IM puts prominent emphasis on 
the significance of individual nurture as a precondition of the Muslim 
community as reflected in Hasan Al-Hudaybi’s statement, a leading 
figure of IM, that “establish dawlah Isla>mi >yah within yourself so that it 
can be erected on your earth.”28 On the other hand, HTI believes that 
the establishment of Muslim individuals and communities must be 
accompanied by the establishment of Dawlah Isla>mi >yah or Khila>fah 
Isla>mi >yah. This is so because society does not only consist of individuals 
but also of interactions among these individuals. The crowd of 
individuals cannot give rise to an integrated society, but to a collection 
of individuals (jama>‘ah). That is why a systemic approach, i.e. Khila>fah 
Isla>mi >yah, is needed to establish a systemic community.  
Like NII, HTI was a clandestine movement during the New Order 
regime.29 The process of teaching and learning within the underground 
circle was carried out in a closed method so that it did not draw any 
suspicion from the government. It was not until Soeharto was 
dethroned that HTI declared its existence openly to the public. The 
collapse of the New Order regime has led to a paradigm shift in its 
                                                 
26 Interview with Ismail Yusanto, Jakarta, 11 May 2005. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Jamhari and Jajang Jahhroni, Gerakan Salafi Radikal di Indonesia (Jakarta: Rajawali 
Press, 2004), p. 175. 
29 Ibid., pp. 172-3. See also, Agus Salim, “The Rise of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia,” pp. 
37-9. 
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modus operandi from underground to a public movement. In this 
sense, HTI denies the accusation that indoctrination is the way it 
employs to disseminate its ideas to its members and wider public. 
What is apparent, instead, is the fact that dakwah is undertaken through 
a persuasive, open and critical method. Any segment of society is 
regarded as a potential cadre of HTI.  
In the perspective of social movement theory, the stage of birth 
and development of HTI in Indonesia can be explained as follows. 
The first stage, marh}alah al-tathqi >f, parallels with the so-called 
“Hibernation Phase” (1980-1999), where the movement operated 
secretively and clandestinely as a response to harsh measures by the 
government. This is a phase of guardianship and training of cadres. 
This phase was attributed to the strategy of the Prophet Muhammad in 
proselytizing the Meccan community to Islam during his early phase to 
avoid the resistance of the public. The second stage, tafa>‘ul ma‘a al-na>s, 
can also be called as the “Formative Phase” (2000-2001), where HT 
engaged and interacted with the public. This formative phase began 
with the mobilization of around 5000 supporters to attend an 
international conference on the Khila>fah Isla>mi >yyah in Jakarta on 28 May 
2000. The third stage, Marh}alah Istila>m al-H{ukm or the “Escalation 
Phase” (2002-2004), signifies the intense protest actions and 
demonstrations, and a variety of collective actions such as the issuance 
of official statements, marches, conferences, and visits to government 
and press offices.30  
In 2007, HTI held a relatively successful first international 
conference on Khila>fah at Gelora Bung Karno, the tenth largest 
stadium in the world and it equals with the Melbourne cricket 
ground.31 The conference was held on 12 August 2007, corresponding 
to 12 Rajab 1248, which is the Hijri date of the destruction of Khila>fah 
system in Turkey on 12 Rajab 1342. Over one hundred thousand 
attendants were expected to come to the conference. The conference 
was attended by HT leaders all around the world such as Shaikh Issam 
Ameera (HT Palestine), Shaikh Uthman Abu Khalil (HT Sudan), 
                                                 
30 Ibid., pp. 39-57. 
31 See, http://www.khilafah.com/kcom/activism/asia/international-khilafah-confe-
rence-2007.html, accessed: 9 January 2008. See also, http://www.hizb.org.uk/hizb/-
global-photos/in-pictures-hti-international-khilafah-conference.html, accessed: 9 Janu-
ary 2008.  
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Hasan Ko Nakata (Japan), and others. Two of the HT leaders 
scheduled to give speech in the conference, Imran Waheed (HT 
Britain) and Shaikh Ismail Al-Wahwah (HT Australia) were deported 
by the government as soon as they arrived at the Soekarno-Hatta 
airport.32 Some other local prominent figures also attended the 
conference such as Din Syamsuddin, the Chairman of Muhammadiyah, 
Abdullah Gymnastiar, a famous cleric and the principal of pesantren 
Darut Tauhid Bandung, and Amrullah Ahmad, the Secretary General 
of Majlis Ulama Indonesia (MUI/Indonesia Religious Scholars 
Council).33  
It should be emphasized that in disseminating its ideas and 
ideology, HTI relies heavily on its own publications. It has so far 
produced massive printed materials in the form of leaflets, books and 
journals, partly thanks to its own publication company called Pustaka 
Thariqul Izzah located in Bogor. Dozens of books, mostly translations 
from Arabic, have been produced from this publication. Its bulletin, al-
Islam, and its journal, Al-Wa‘ie help spread HTI’s ideas more rapidly to 
the society. These printed materials are open to the public and are sold 
in several well-known local bookstores, so that any individual outside 
the inner circle can have immediate access to them. The publications 
are made possible in part by the contribution of Badan Wakaf al-Salam, 
HTI’s philanthropy body to channel the distribution of zakat (alms-
giving) and organize fund-raising activities to fund the publication of 
its printed materials. This institution contributes to delegating HTI’s 
outstanding preachers into public mosques in Jakarta and its 
surrounding areas, in addition to seminars and conferences.34 
The concept of Khila>fah Isla>mi >yah is not perceived as the end of 
HTI’s journey, but rather as a means (t }ari >qah) to realize the 
implementation of Islam at a practical level. The objective is to make 
and disseminate Islam as a blessing to the entire universe (rah}matan li 
al-‘a>lami >n). This objective, according to HTI, can only be achieved 
through systematic and planned steps by pious and committed 
Muslims who dedicate their life to God’s cause. Nevertheless, the 
Khila>fah has become one of the main concerns of HTI because the 
                                                 
32 “Hizbut Tahrir Siap Gandeng Parpol,” Sindo, 13 August 2007. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid., pp. 142-43. 
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leadership of Muslims will determine the destiny of Islam in its future. 
Even though HTI does not agree with the existing state system in 
Indonesia, a coup d’etat to overthrow the constitutional government 
of the country is regarded as unlawful. This view was also upheld 
during the presidency of Megawati Sukarnoputri, despite the calls from 
some Muslim groups to reject her simply because she is a woman. HTI 
is thus concerned with replacing the system, not individual persons. 
This is partly because attempts to transform the public will be more 
effective by means of system.35 
In contrast to other Islamist groups which are more often easily 
trapped in excommunication attitudes towards the other, HTI seems 
to be more moderate in the sense that it does not position itself as the 
only true representation of Islam. This organization views differences 
in interpreting Islam as taken for granted, an undeniable fact that 
should not lead to internal conflict among Muslims. HTI proponents 
consider this as a matter of ikhtila>f (variation in religion), which is 
considered as not fundamental (us}u>li>yah), but derivative (furu>‘i>yah) in 
religion. It is assumed that there can be no black-and-white type of 
understanding religion. Rather, there can be grey and no one can claim 
his understanding of Islam as the only true version of Islam. In any 
case, differences can be resolved by referring to the soundest 
argument.36  
In terms of religious thought, HTI tolerates differences in 
understanding religion insofar as it is not related to the fundamentals 
of religion, such as the issue of secularism in Islam propagated by 
liberal Muslim activists. In HTI’s view, a firm standing must be upheld 
with regards to the issue of secularism in religion, and there are only 
two choices to be taken: either right or wrong. HTI activists argue that 
it is inherent in the Islamic nature that politics must be integrated into 
religion (di >n wa al-dawlah). Notwithstanding HTI’s firm stance towards 
this issue, it does not excommunicate liberal Muslim activists as ka>fir 
(apostates). They consider them still as Muslims, but their thinking is in 
deviation from (true) Islam. In this regard, the official attitude of HTI 
is more similar to that of mainstream organizations such as 
Muhammadiyah and NU. 
                                                 
35 Endang Turmudi and Riza Sihbudi (eds), Islam dan Radikalisme di Indonesia, pp. 277-8. 
36 Ibid., pp. 278-9. Isma’il Yusanto, Interview, Jakarta, 11 May 2005. 
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HTI denounces liberal Muslim activists on the grounds that the 
latter do not support the implementation of Shari >‘a. Nevertheless, HTI 
does not need to launch rage or hostility, let alone physical violence, 
against them. HTI is of the view that deviant thinking cannot be 
opposed by violent acts, but by thinking. Only by this way, they 
believe, can the Muslim community at large reflect upon which 
viewpoint is acceptable. Such a response is diametrically opposed to 
that of other Islamist groups that resist fiercely the thinking of Muslim 
liberals by means of terror and physical threats.37  
Social Construction of Anti-Democracy Discourses  
It is noteworthy that the antagonistic attitude of Indonesian 
Islamists towards democracy is not constructed on a vacuum spot; 
their anti-democracy discourses are socio-politically constructed. 
Despite the fact that normative texts such as the Qur’a>n and H{adi >th do 
not explicitly mention democracy or the like, Islamists prove to be able 
to show their knack at basing their arguments on textual and 
normative justification. This underpinning is then forged by 
contextualizing their textual arguments with logical grand-narratives of 
the current socio-political circumstances as well as their past memories 
of historical Islam. In order to amplify this argument, Indonesian 
Islamists aggrandize the agony of Muslims all over the world who are 
imagined to be under siege and the oppression of God’s enemies. They 
deplore the moral decay rampant in current Indonesian politics as well 
as corruption and political conflicts among the elites, assuming that 
these stem from the blind adoption of democracy. The only single 
solution to this problem, in their point of view, is Islam.  
For Islamists in general and HTI activists in particular, language 
plays a crucial role in producing and reproducing discourses and 
counter-discourses.38 Discourses on democracy developed by Islamists 
are of course political, as can be detected in the lexicons and semantics 
of any other language. Shapiro, following Foucault, observes that the 
                                                 
37 Ulil Abshar-Abdalla, a liberal Muslim activist was given a death sentence by MUI 
Bandung for his controversial column in a national newspaper. He was also threatened 
by a clandestine JI activist with murder but neglected after he found that a death 
penalty must be executed by an authoritative body. 
38 For further information on Wittgenstein’s “language game theory,” see Ludwig 
Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (Oxford, UK: Basil Blackwell, 1958). 
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use of language is determined by discourse.39 That Islamists, for 
instance, prefer the use of their own heritage language (Arabic) over 
the language of those who invented or were influenced by Western 
worldviews is indeed political. That the former speak a language that 
minimizes the import of either direct idioms or words from anything 
English or Dutch is also very political. Language in this context is 
deployed not only as a matter of maintaining a certain cultural identity 
or simply as ideas exchange, but also as a conduit of maintaining and 
preserving the purity of Islamic culture. This means that for Islamists 
culture does really matter for their “inner” identity through which the 
soul of Islam can be transmitted without corruption and innovation. It 
is not surprising that in order to keep their Muslimhood preserved 
Islamists are concerned with the use of idioms and words that are 
derived directly from the sacred texts which are in Arabic. Along with 
this course, maintaining normative Islam as it is in Arabic is a part of 
power aggregation. It is also within this context that anti-Westernism 
and anti-Americanism are among the most exploited symbols in the 
Islamists’ discourses in their rejection of democracy, especially by 
depicting democracy as an un-Islamic, corrupt and unholy political 
system.  
The social construction of an enemy is neither peculiar to Islamists 
in Indonesia, nor is it a new development in politics of Islamism more 
generally.40 In this regard, religious language taken from the texts is an 
integral part of the construction of evil. Despite their different 
backgrounds, religious texts provide a plethora of names, labels and 
symbols that can be deployed readily by Islamists to identify their 
enemies in specific circumstances. T{a>ghu >t, Ya’ju >j and Ma’ju >j, Dajja>l, 
ja>hili>yah (ignorance), shayt }a>n (devil), ka>fir (unbeliever), munkar (evil), and 
many others are among the most popular labels found in the Qur’a>n.41 
                                                 
39 Michael Shapiro, Language and Political Understanding (Michigan: UMI Out-Of-Print 
Books on Demand, 1981), p. 24. 
40 Constructing Muslims as a new enemy has been a hotly debated issue since the 
September 11 tragedy. One of the debates has been codified by Emran Qureshi and 
Michael A. Sells (eds), The New Crusades: Constructing the Muslim Enemy (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2003). 
41 Such labels that can be easily found in the Qur’an can lead to a sense of self-fulfilling 
prophecy, particularly in a negative sense. Most Islamists deploy such labels to portray 
the contemporary situation of their time and to predict the trajectory of themselves 
and their enemies in the future.  
  357 JOURNAL OF INDONESIAN ISLAM 
Volume 03, Number 02, December 2009 
Socio-political Construction of anti-Democracy Discourse 
Those names and labels are used to describe bad characters and 
profiles that are supposed to be in opposition to God’s side. Whatever 
idea emerges from the non-Muslim world, but especially the West and 
its allies, will be identified as evil and, thus, deserves to be treated as 
enemy. Capitalism, socialism, communism, secularism, democracy, 
liberalism, pluralism, and individualism are clear examples of Islamists’ 
enemies from outside. Islamists believe that combating these enemies 
is in the Path of God (Sabi >l Alla>h) which necessitates struggle (jiha>d) 
both in a physical sense, i.e. war, and a non-physical sense, i.e. 
intellectual (ghazw al-fikr) and spiritual. The bad images of God’s 
enemies are boosted through a series of ill-treated experiences of 
Muslims such as US invasions of some Muslim lands, bad treatment 
towards Muslim prisoners accused of being terrorists, Zionist 
campaigns in support of Israel and racial discrimination towards 
Muslims at home and abroad.42 
Although anti-Westernism and anti-Americanism did not influence 
the mainstream of Indonesian Islam, its existence still contributes to a 
wider social milieu conducive to the longer-term political survival of 
Islamist groups. In other words, when uttered by ostensibly 
respectable mainstream politicians, anti-Americanism is afforded a 
degree of social legitimacy that creates a space for militant and terrorist 
groups whose agendas rest on the belief that the US poses a direct 
threat to Muslims in general and to Indonesian Muslims in particular. 
These anti-American discourses can therefore help such groups recruit 
adherents from those small pockets of Indonesian society that have 
lost faith in the promises of secular democracy.43 This latter mindset 
risks creating an atmosphere that tolerates fund-raising and 
recruitment for anti-American violence elsewhere in the world. 
However we understand this potential, there is a need to also 
understand how culture and identity, especially Islamic identity, have 
been instrumentalised within Indonesian politics.  
Conspiracy theories are complementary to the discourses of anti-
democracy developed by Indonesian Islamists. The conspiracy theories 
                                                 
42 David Wright-Neville, “Anti-Westernism, Indonesian Democracy and the ‘Politics 
of Dashed Expectations’,” in Margaret Kartomi (ed.), The Year of Voting Frequently: 
Politics and Artists in Indonesia’s 2004 Elections, Annual Indonesia Lecture Series Number 
27 (Clayton: Monash Asia Institute, 2005), pp. 115-16. 
43 Ibid., p. 116. 
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used may be traced back to numerous anti-Western, anti-capitalist, 
anti-bourgeois or anti-liberalism discourses where it comes to provide 
a more or less coherent ideological idioms and jargons: the “West,” 
“Liberalism,” “Capitalism,” “Modernity,” “Christianity-Zionism,” and 
so forth.44 It is likely that the demonization of the US and the West in 
general, to a large extent, is created by Islamists as a response to the 
same demonization made by the US towards the Islamists, particularly 
in the post-September 11 era.45 They suspect that the demonization of 
Islam by the US happens in tandem with the global project of the US’ 
war on terrorism which has sketched a notoriously bad image of 
radical Islamists and Jihadists.46 Interestingly enough, Islamists in 
Indonesia do not deny the existence of global Jihadists. They also 
admit that Jihadists such as Imam Samudra, Azahari Husin, Noordin 
Mohd. Top and others were behind several violent attacks in 
Indonesia. However, Islamists believe more in conspiracy theories than 
in the pure ideology of Jihadism as the mastermind of terrorism 
attacks. Yusanto, for instance, believes that a well-planned intelligence 
operation was behind those attacks. He assumes that there was a subtle 
infiltration of Islamist groups to instill the false doctrine of jiha>d and 
istishha>d (martyrdom). The purpose was to create the image that 
Indonesia is a hotbed of terrorism. In his view it is strange that there 
was little damage inflicted on the actual target, which were the US and 
                                                 
44 For further discussion on conspiracy theories see, among others, Leonidas Donskis, 
“The Conspiracy Theory, Demonization of the Other,” Innovation, vol. 11, 3 (1998): 
pp. 349-360. 
45 For a discussion on how the US constructs its enemy particularly after September 11 
see, among others, Eleanor Stein, “Construction of an Enemy,” Monthly Review 55, 3 
(Jul/Aug 2003), pp. 125-29. For the socio-political construction of the enemy among 
Indonesian Islamists see, for instance, Farid Wajdi, “Propaganda Jahat Bush terhadap 
Islam dan Khilafah,” under the rubric Opini Anda, available at: http://hizbut-
tahrir.or.id/main.php?page=opini&id=21, accessed on 14 December 2005. See also, 
“Bush Perjelas Permusuhannya terhadap Islam dan Sistem Khilafah,” weekly editorial, 
25 October 2005, available at: http://hizbut-tahrir.or.id/main.php?page=editorial-
&id=16, accessed on 14 December 2005; cf. “Mewaspadai Upaya Penghancuran 
Islam,” Buletin al-Islam, edition 254, 14 May 2005, available at: http://hizbut-
tahrir.or.id/main.php?page=alislam&id=254, accessed on 15 December 2005.  
46 M. Ramdhan Adhi, “Strategi AS di Dunia Islam Pasca 11/9,” Al-Wa’ie, No. 61 
(September 2005), available at: http://hizbut-tahrir.or.id/main.php?page=alwaie&id-
=81, accessed on 14 December 2005.  
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its alliance partners.47 Rather, the attacks damaged local people and 
Indonesia in general. 
Terrorist acts in Indonesia are nothing more than “terorisme 
jadi-jadian” (fabricated terrorism). They’re based on an 
order, they’re a fake. There was a strong sense of 
infiltration, provocation, and radicalization among the 
Muslims, to create a certain stigma. Azhari is dead already. 
The logic is that the terrorism threats should be over now 
that the performer is dead. But he is only a wayang (puppet), 
not a dalang (performer). If the performer is still alive, there 
will be other plots and other actors. I believe in this 
scenario.48  
In other words, Islamists argue that the US and its allies are the 
great masterminds behind those jihadist operations, to undermine the 
power of Islam. This is so because the US and the West, rather than 
Islam and the Muslims, which are perceived to be in a weak position, 
are dominating the world by means of capitalism. The Islamists depict 
Muslims as the victim of globalization and they point their finger 
blame to the US and the West in general.49  
Islamist discourses of anti-democracy are wrapped within modern 
arguments and narratives. Even though there is a sense of 
simplification, generalization, and exaggeration, the demonization done 
by Islamists is constructed in more advanced arguments and narratives 
that sound logical and thought-provoking. In constructing their 
arguments, they use sophisticated structural analyses, especially 
conspiracy theories, which tend to justify the arguments of post-
colonial critics to the West. Thus they share their arguments with post-
colonial and post-modernist critics to modernity, which is considered 
as morally wicked and corrupt.50  
                                                 
47 HTI, “Islam Jadi Korban Terorisme, padahal korban bom di Indonesia kebanyakan 
beragama Islam,” http://hizbut-tahrir.or.id/main.php?page=news&id=279, accessed: 
12 February 2007. 
48 Ibid. 
49 See HTI, “Konspirasi Kafir Barat Menyerang Ummat Islam,” Bulletin al-Islam, No 
23 13 September 2000 available at: http://hizbut-tahrir.or.id/main.php?page=alislam-
&id=23.  
50 For an interesting account of the Islamists’ paradigm of looking at modernity see, 
for instance, Roxanne L. Euben, “Premodern, Antimodern or Postmodern? Islamic 
and Western Critiques of Modernity,” The Review of Politics 59, 3 (Summer 1997), pp. 
429-459. 
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Democracy is perceived as something derived from the enemies of 
God who have been engaged in ceaseless attempts to subjugate 
Muslims all over the world, especially in the lands of Palestine, 
Afghanistan and Iraq. Islamists are also convinced that Muslims are 
under siege from God’s enemies who are destroying Islam step by 
step. By this definition, Indonesian Islamists are constructing the 
concept of enemy in light of the self-fulfilling prophecy on the basis of 
the sacred texts which are used as a mirror to define themselves and 
their enemies.51 The construction of the enemy is thus very much 
influenced by prejudice and the ideology of hatred. In order to 
strengthen the differences between their own identity and that of the 
enemy, Islamists use the logics of binary opposition to erect a wall of 
virtues which separates them from the others. They describe 
themselves as pious and the chosen community as mandated by the 
sacred texts whose responsibility it is to give the rest heavenly guidance 
and salvation. By doing so, the rest is defined as whatever they 
themselves are not.  
In an article written by Denny Kodrat, the Chief of Lajnah Siya>si>yah 
[the Commission of Politics] of HTI of West Java, for instance, the 
construction of the enemy is raised partly as a reply or a kind of self-
defense in response to the Bush administration’s paradigm of the “axis 
of evil”, which is mainly directed against Islam and Muslims.52 In this 
article, the writer asks a rhetorical question to denounce the Bush 
administration’s demonizing of Islam and Muslims: “Who is 
ideologically evil?” In his opinion, when the US is pointing its finger to 
Islam and Muslims as the axis of evil, it is basically pointing its finger 
to itself as the real Satan of the world. In supporting this argument, 
Kodrat refers to Noam Chomsky’s criticism of the US with the use of 
parable as follows: “Alexander the Great captured a pirate and asked, 
“Why do you make a terror in the sea?” The pirate replied, “Why do 
you make a chaos in the world? Because I use a small ship, you call me 
a terrorist; and you? Because you do with a huge ship you are called a 
Caesar!”53  
                                                 
51 James A. Aho, This Thing of Darkness, especially pp. 23-34. 
52 Denny Kodrat, “Barat dan ‘Ideologi Setan,’” Al-Wa’ie, edition 61, available at 
http://hizbut-tahrir.or.id/main.php?page=alwaie&id=70, accessed on 13 December 
2005.  
53 Chomsky’s critical ideas towards the US have been widely shared by HTI activists in 
expounding the conspiracy theories of the US to undermine the power of Islam. 
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In his article, Kodrat shortlists the historical sins done by the US 
to the world. He accuses the US of being responsible for numerous 
conflicts and civil wars after World War II, including conflicts in 
Greece (1947-1949), Italy (1948), Korea (1950-1953), Iran (1953), 
Guatemala (1954), Zaire (1960), Cuba (1961), Vietnam (1961-1975), 
Dominica (1965), Kampuchea (1969-1971), Chili (1973), Grenada 
(1983), Lebanon (1958 and 1983), Libya (1986), Panama (1989), Iraq 
(1991, 1993, 1998-1999 and 2003-now), Somalia (1991-1992), 
Afghanistan (1998-2002), and Serbia (1999).54 Many of the US military 
operations in these conflicts indicate that this country is too ambitious 
to control the world in order to maintain its hegemony and defend its 
economic interests. This, in Kodrat’s opinion, also shows how ugly the 
face of capitalist ideology is as practiced by the US through its vulgar 
imperialism, wrapped in false slogans such as “pre-emptive strike,” 
“internal security,” “world order, and “international peace.”  
In Kodrat’s opinion, the West’s accusation that Islam represents a 
satanic ideology which is against human rights, democracy and 
freedom, which is prone to terror and conflict, and which deploys 
physical violence as a means of achieving ideological purposes deserves 
to be questioned further. If these accusations are used as a standard to 
demonize a certain ideology, it is the West that should be accused first 
of having a satanic ideology. In his view, there are several reasons to 
explain this argument.  
First, in terms of the appreciation of human rights, one sees that 
the capitalist ideology in its early stage tends to side with the elites 
whose huge economic capital is unfavorable to the oppressed. As an 
illustration, he goes on to argue, when the world became aware of the 
pollution through gas emissions produced by the industrial countries, 
they aggregated to overcome this problem by making an agreement 
among them called the Treaty of Kyoto (Kyoto Protocol). Despite the 
conflict of interests among some of the developed countries, the treaty 
has been eventually ratified by most of the world’s nations, except the 
US and Australia, countries with extremely high amounts of gas 
emissions.  
                                                                                                      
Chomsky’s book, Maling Teriak Maling: Amerika Sang Teroris?, published by Mizan 
[Bandung] in 2001, a translated version of his book, entitled September 11, was among 
the bestsellers widely consumed after the September 11 tragedy. See Noam Chomsky, 
September 11 (Crows Nest, NSW: Allen & Unwin, 2001). 
54 Denny Kodrat, “Barat dan ‘Ideologi Setan.’” 
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Another lucid example regards the legality of abortion.55 As the 
industrial countries legalize abortion as a consequence of the tradition 
of free sex, this policy contradicts the very fact that the state 
guarantees the people’s right to live, because abortion represents the 
confiscation of an infant’s right to live. To support his argument, 
Kodrat refers to statistical data released by Henshaw and Morrow 
(1990), stating that the largest share of abortions in the world is 
ironically undertaken in the following industrial countries: the US, 
Denmark, Sweden, Italy, Norway, Finland, Canada, Netherlands, 
France, United Kingdom, and New Zealand.56 The high levels of 
abortion bring about cultural dissemination among Western societies 
as if killing is a legal action. When the state legalizes abortion due to 
materialistic reasons (utilitarianism), it is clear that the state is unable to 
protect human rights, one of which is the right to live for the infant. 
This reflects the inability of the state to safeguard the right to live, one 
of the most elementary human rights.57  
Second, with regards to the Bush administration’s war on 
terrorism, Kodrat argues that the real and greatest terrorist with the 
biggest amount of casualties throughout the history of mankind is the 
West, not Islam. Kodrat refers to some events throughout the history 
of Western civilization which resulted in bloodshed, particularly the 
chaotic turmoil during the Medieval Ages, the Crusades, and the first 
and second World Wars. For the West, Kodrat argues, massacre is a 
ritual to force its ideology upon others. In the case of the Crusades, for 
instance, while Saladin freed al-Quds without bloodshed, the Crusade 
warriors did the contrary. The blood of Muslims had to be spilled due 
to the atrocities perpetrated by the Crusade warriors. The same thing 
happened when the US military forces invaded some Muslim lands 
such as Iraq and Afghanistan. The maltreatment of Muslim prisoners 
and the harassment of the Qur’an in Guantanamo Bay and Abu 
Ghraib prisons have notoriously bolstered the satanic character of the 
US and its capitalism and democracy. With the support of the principle 
                                                 
55 A formal statement has recently been released by HTI regarding its rejection of 
abortion. See Kantor Jubir HTI, “Pernyataan Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia: Menolak 
Legalisasi Aborsi,” issued on 14 September 2005, available at: http://hizbut-
tahrir.or.id/ver/lowres/main.php?page=jubir&id=15, accessed on 17 December 2005. 
56 The book Kodrat is referring to is S.K. Henshaw and E. Morrow, Induced Abortion: A 
World Review, 1990 Supplement (Geneva: Alan Guttmacher Institute, 1990). 
57 Denny Kodrat, “Barat dan ‘Ideologi Setan.’”  
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“the end justifies the means,” the Machiavellian ideology of capitalism 
is allowed to do anything necessary for the sake of its own interests 
such as agitation, violence and anarchism, regardless of its destructive 
impacts on others. 
Third, the idea of freedom echoed by Western capitalist countries 
is not more than an illusion and myth.58 As soon as freedom is 
counter-productive to its ideology, the state will consequently 
amputate it. This was the case in France where the government banned 
all types of religious symbols in public life, including the headscarf for 
Muslim women, even though this country claims to adopt democratic 
freedom of expression and religion. Why is Hizbut Tahrir considered 
illegal in Germany although this country claims to be open-minded and 
respectful towards freedom of expression? Why is Iran not allowed to 
advance its nuclear energy project while at the same time many 
Western countries develop the same project? These are the questions 
that will finally open up the moral wickedness of capitalism and 
democracy. So, when the West pinpoints Islam as a satanic ideology, 
the fact is that it is pinpointing at itself as the real satanic ideology, 
Islamists go on to argue. It is the double standard of the West in 
implementing democracy that Islamists constantly criticize.  
Significantly, the notion of enemy is not only constructed in 
response to external enemies. Enemies can threaten from within as 
well, i.e. from their co-religionists upon whom they predicated as 
“deviant” Islam.59 This is to invoke the sense of being under constant 
siege both externally and internally. They denounce their co-religionists 
–especially those from the NGO and intellectual activist scene funded 
by international agencies – who campaign for democratization, human 
rights, gender equality, pluralism, and liberalism, as agents of the West 
seeking only to destroy Islam from within. Ulil Abshar-Abdalla with 
                                                 
58 This opinion is also shared by Farid Wajdi, “Larangan Jilbab dan Mitos Demokrasi,” 
Pikiran Rakyat, Opinion Column, 19 January 2004; cf. his “Motif Sesungguhnya 
Pelarangan Hijab,” available at http://swaramuslim.net/more.php?id=1661_0_0_1-
_0_M, accessed on 17 July 2005. 
59 M. Shiddiq al-Jawi, Ushul Fiqh Palsu Kaum Liberal,” Al-Wa’ie, edition 56, available 
at: http://hizbut-tahrir.or.id/main.php?page=alwaie&id=7, accessed on 16 December 
2005; cf. M. Shiddiq al-Jawi, “Kelompok Liberal itu Agen Penjajah,” al-Wa’ie, edition 
58, available at: http://hizbut-tahrir.or.id/main.php?page=alwaie&id=34, accessed on 
16 December 2005. 
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his JIL team (Jaringan Islam Liberal/Liberal Islam Network) has been 
resisted severely as one of the enemies from within.60 
Even though the US has done quite a lot to deal with the issue of 
terrorism under the project of “War on Terror” – such as military 
intervention in Iraq and Afghanistan, providing a great deal of funding 
to support the bills of anti-terrorism in many Muslim countries, 
persuading the regimes of countries serving as its agents to arrest 
“Muslim hard-liners,” provoking Muslims through the tongue of 
leaders of its proxy countries such as John Howard, the Prime Minister 
of Australia, Lee Kuan Yew, the Senior Minister of Singapore, and 
Goh Tjok Tong, the Prime Minister of Singapore, and so forth – the 
US seems to need other hands taken from within to fight against Islam 
and Muslims, namely secularized liberal activists such as Ulil Abshar-
Abdalla and his colleagues of Liberal Islam Network (JIL).61 
Since the collapse of Soeharto’s New Order regime, the same 
pattern of constructing an enemy has also been established to 
denounce the existing regime as un-Islamic and pro-Western. 
Abdurrahman Wahid, the former respected leader of Nahdlatul Ulama 
(NU) and former Indonesian president, has been targeted by Islamists’ 
resentment due to his support for democracy. Likewise, the last two 
presidents – Megawati Sukarnoputri and Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono 
– have also been criticized as being controlled by capitalist powers due 
to their support for democracy.  
Conclusion 
From the above description we learn  that the HTI activists’ 
rejection of democracy is constructed not only on theological basis but 
also on socio-political one. In most cases, theological arguments are 
complimentary in so far as the socio-political arguments need further 
support. This means that socio-political arguments come first prior to 
theological ones. The Islamists usually refer to current socio-political 
constellation as their main reference of repudiating the idea democracy 
by keep arguing that within democracy lie all kinds of socio-political 
decay. Islam, they maintain, serves as the only solution for all maladies 
made by humans since Islam is a heavenly entity revealed to all human 
                                                 
60 Farid Wadjdi, “Tiga Agenda Menghadapi Pemikiran Liberal,” Hayatulislam.com, 
26/05/2005.  
61 HTI, “Islam Liberal: Liberalisme Berbaju Islam,” Buletin Al-Islam (1 January 2003). 
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beings, not only to Muslims. By means of transnational system of 
governance better-known as Khila>fah Isla>mi >yah (Islamic Caliphate 
system) they believe that the shortcomings of man-made ideologies 
can be solved. It is only such a political system that is able to ensure 
the harmony among civilizations and secure the rights of non-Muslim 
community even though it is not clear whether the non-Muslims will 
have the equal rights as Muslims do. 
All entities outside of Islam such as democracy are perceived as 
something derived from the enemies of God who are presumed to 
threaten and subjugate Muslims all over the world. Democracy is a part 
of human’s revolt against God. Under the system of democracy, 
sovereignty lies at the hands of the people where people can produce 
laws that contradict Islamic law. It is within this reason that the 
Islamists will not let all man-made entities rule over humankind. Along 
with this, Indonesian Islamists are constructing the concept of enemy 
based on the concept of binary opposition between the “authentic” 
selves and the “corrupted” ones. They describe themselves as pious, 
authentic and unadulterated whose responsibility is to assist the rest 
with heavenly guidance and salvation. By doing so, the rest is defined 
as whatever they themselves are not.  
Warriors need enemies, without which the self will mean nothing. 
The entity of the enemy is not something constructed in a vacuum, 
socially and politically. This means that the concept of enemy is 
ontologically constructed for the purpose of self-fulfilling prophecy. 
To the Islamists, the word enemy can take different forms from time 
to time, contingent upon the context of when and where Islam is 
present. The process of socio-political construction of the enemy 
follows what Berger and Luckmann have itemized: naming, 
legitimation, mythmaking, sedimentation, and ritual.  
For Islamists in general and HTI activists in particular, language 
plays a crucial role in producing and reproducing discourses and 
counter-discourses. Discourses on democracy developed by Islamists 
are of course political, as can be detected in the lexicons and semantics 
of any other language. Language in this context is deployed not only as 
a matter of maintaining a certain cultural identity or simply as ideas 
exchange, but also as a conduit of maintaining and preserving the 
purity of Islamic culture. This means that for Islamists culture does 
really matter for their “inner” identity through which the soul of Islam 
can be transmitted without corruption and innovation. It is not 
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surprising that in order to keep their Muslimhood preserved Islamists 
are concerned with the use of idioms and words that are derived 
directly from the sacred texts which are in Arabic. In line with this, 
maintaining normative Islam as it is in Arabic is a part of power 
aggregation. Likewise, anti-Westernism and anti-Americanism are 
among the most exploited symbols in the Islamists’ discourses in their 
rejection of democracy, especially by depicting democracy as an un-
Islamic, corrupted and “unholy” system of governance. []  
Bibliography 
Books and Articles 
Adhi, M. Ramdhan. “Strategi AS di Dunia Islam Pasca 11/9.” Al-
Wa’ie, No. 61 (September 2005), available at: http://hizbut-
tahrir.or.id/main.php?page=alwaie&id=81, accessed on 14 
December 2005.  
Aho, James A. This Thing of Darkness: A Sociology of the Enemy. Seattle 
and London: University of Washington Press, 1994. 
Al-Jawi, M. Shiddiq. “Kelompok Liberal itu Agen Penjajah.” al-Wa’ie, 
edition 58, available at: http://hizbut-tahrir.or.id/main.php?-
page=alwaie&id=34, accessed on 16 December 2005. 
----------. “Ushul Fiqh Palsu Kaum Liberal.” Al-Wa’ie, edition 56, 
http://hizbut-tahrir.or.id/main.php?page=alwaie&id=7, 
accessed on 16 December 2005.  
Al-Nabhani, Taqiyuddin. Pembentukan Partai Politik Islam. Bogor: 
Thariqul Izzah, 2002.  
Arbib, Michael and Mary Hesse. The Construction of Reality. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1986. 
Berger, Peter and Thomas Luckmann. The Social Construction of Reality. 
Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday-Anchor, 1967. 
Berger, Peter L. The Sacred Canopy. New York & London: Anchor 
Books, 1990. 
Chomsky, Noam. Maling Teriak Maling: Amerika Sang Teroris?. Bandung: 
Bandung, 2001. 
Dhume, Sadanand. “Hizbut Tahrir Using War in Iraq to Seek 
Converts.” Far Eastern Economic Review, April 3, 2003. 
  367 JOURNAL OF INDONESIAN ISLAM 
Volume 03, Number 02, December 2009 
Socio-political Construction of anti-Democracy Discourse 
Donskis, Leonidas. “The Conspiracy Theory, Demonization of the 
Other.” Innovation 11, 3 (1998): pp. 349-360. 
Euben, Roxanne L. “Premodern, Antimodern or Postmodern? Islamic 
and Western Critiques of Modernity,” The Review of Politics 59, 3 
(Summer 1997): pp. 429-459. 
Fuller-Collins, Elizabeth. “Islam is the Solution: Dakwah and 
Democracy in Indonesia,” unpublished paper (http://www.clas-
sics.ohiou.edu/faculty/collins/islamsolution.pdf).   
Hallaq, Wael B. “Was the gate of Ijtiha>d closed?,” in I. Edge (ed.), The 
International Library of Essays in Law & Legal Theory: Legal Cultures, 
7. Aldershot: Dartmouth (1996): pp. 287-325. 
Henshaw, S.K. and E. Morrow, Induced Abortion: A World Review, 1990 
Supplement. Geneva: Alan Guttmacher Institute, 1990. 
Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), “Islam Jadi Korban Terorisme, 
padahal korban bom di Indonesia kebanyakan beragama Islam,” 
http://hizbut-tahrir.or.id/main.php?page=news&id=279, 
accessed: 12 February 2007. 
----------. Konspirasi Kafir Barat Menyerang Ummat Islam,” Bulletin al-
Islam, No 23, 13 September 2000 available at: http://hizbut-
tahrir.or.id/main.php?page=alislam&id=23.  
----------. “Islam Liberal: Liberalisme Berbaju Islam,” Buletin Al-Islam 
(1 January 2003). 
----------. “Pernyataan Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia: Menolak Legalisasi 
Aborsi,” issued on 14 September 2005, available at: 
http://hizbut-tahrir.or.id/ver/lowres/main.php?page=jubir-
&id=15, accessed on 17 December 2005. 
Hizbut Tahrir. The Methodology of Hizbut-Tahrir for Change. London: Al-
Khilafah Publications, n.d. 
Jamhari & Jajang Jahroni (eds). Gerakan Salafi Radikal di Indonesia. 
Jakarta: Rajawali Press, 2004.  
Karuvelil, George. “Constructing ‘God’: A Contemporary 
Interpretation of Religion,” HeyJ XLI (2000): pp. 25-46;  
Kodrat, Denny. “Barat dan ‘Ideologi Setan,’” Al-Wa’ie 61, 
http://hizbut-tahrir.or.id/main.php?page=alwaie&id=70, 
accessed on 13 December 2005.  
  
Masdar Hilmy 
JOURNAL OF INDONESIAN ISLAM 
Volume 03, Number 02, December 2009 
368 
Qureshi, Emran and Michael A. Sells (eds). The New Crusades: 
Constructing the Muslim Enemy. New York: Columbia University 
Press, 2003. 
Roy, Olivier. Globalised Islam: The Search for a New Ummah. London: 
Hurst, 2004, 9.  
Salim, Agus. “The Rise of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (1982-2004): Its 
Political Opportunity Structure, Resource Mobilization, and 
Collective Action Frames.” Jakarta: UIN Syarif Hidayatullah 
Jakarta, Masters Thesis, 2005.  
Shain, Ralph. “Situating Derrida: Between Kierkegaard and Hegel.” 
Philosophy Today 44, No. 4 (Winter 2004): pp. 388-403. 
Shapiro, Michael. Language and Political Understanding. Michigan: UMI 
Out-Of-Print Books on Demand, 1981. 
Stein, Eleanor. “Construction of an Enemy.” Monthly Review 55, 3 
(Jul/Aug 2003): pp. 125-29.  
Taji-Farouki, Suha. A Fundamental Quest: Hizb al-Tahrir and the Search for 
the Islamic Caliphate. London: Grey Seal, 1996.  
Turmudi, Endang & Riza Sihbudi (eds), Islam dan Radikalisme di 
Indonesia. Jakarta: LIPI Press, 2005. 
Voll, John Obert. Islam, Continuity and Change in the Modern World. 
Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1982. 
Wadjdi, Farid. “Tiga Agenda Menghadapi Pemikiran Liberal,” 
Hayatulislam.com, 26/05/2005.  
----------. “Larangan Jilbab dan Mitos Demokrasi,” Pikiran Rakyat, 19 
January 2004. 
----------. “Mewaspadai Upaya Penghancuran Islam,” Buletin al-Islam 
254, 14 Mei 2005 (http://www.hayatulislam.net/weblog.php?id-
=C36_8_1), accessed 12 December 2005 
----------. “Propaganda Jahat Bush terhadap Islam dan Khilafah,” under 
the rubric Opini Anda, available at: http://hizbut-tahrir.or.id/-
main.php?page=opini&id=21, accessed on 14 December 2005.  
----------. “Bush Perjelas Permusuhannya terhadap Islam dan Sistem 
Khilafah,” weekly editorial, 25 October 2005, available at: 
http://hizbut-tahrir.or.id/main.php?page=editorial&id=16, 
accessed on 14 December 2005. 
  369 JOURNAL OF INDONESIAN ISLAM 
Volume 03, Number 02, December 2009 
Socio-political Construction of anti-Democracy Discourse 
Weiss, B. “Interpretation in Islamic Law: the Theory of Ijtiha>d,” in I. 
Edge (ed.), The International Library of Essays in Law & Legal 
Theory: Legal Cultures, 7. Aldershot: Dartmouth (1996): pp. 273-
286.  
Wittgenstein, Ludwig. Philosophical Investigations. Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell, 1958. 
Wright-Neville, David. “Anti-Westernism, Indonesian Democracy and 
the ‘Politics of Dashed Expectations,’” in Margaret Kartomi 
(ed.), The Year of Voting Frequently: Politics and Artists in Indonesia’s 
2004 Elections, Annual Indonesia Lecture Series number 27 
(Clayton: Monash Asia Institute, 2005): pp. 105-122. 
Newspapers 
“Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia: Dakwah Masjid yang Menggurita,” Sabili, 
No. 9/XI, special edition, 2003.  
“Hizbut Tahrir Siap Gandeng Parpol,” Sindo, 13 August 2007. 
Websites: 
http://www.hizb.org.uk/hizb/global-photos/in-pictures-hti-internati-
onal-khilafah-conference.html. 
http://www.hizbuttahrir.org.uk.  
http://www.khilafah.com/kcom/activism/asia/international-khilafah-
conference-2007.html. 
